































This study shows that, in an unregulated fee-setting environment, specialist physicians 
practice price discrimination on the basis of their patients’ income status. Our results are 
consistent with profit maximisation behaviour by specialists. These findings are based on a 
large population survey that is linked to administrative medical claims records. We find that, 
for an initial consultation, specialist physicians charge their high-income patients AU$26 
more than their low-income patients. This gap equates to a 19% lower fees for the poorest 
patients (bottom 25% of the household income distribution), though it is unlikely to remove 
the substantial financial barriers they face in accessing specialist care. There are large 
variations across specialties, with neurologists exhibiting the largest fee gap between the 
high- and low-income patients. Several possible channels for deducing the patient’s income 
are examined. We find that patient characteristics such as age, health concession card 
status and private health insurance status are all used by specialists as proxies for income 
status. These characteristics are particularly important to further practice price 
discrimination among the low-income patients, but are less relevant for the high-income 








‘The Government can make laws regarding the payment of benefits for medical and dental 
services; it has no authority to control the amount doctors charge for their services as this 
would amount to civil conscription. Doctors are free to determine their own value of the 
health service they provide…they may alter their fees for particular individuals if they 
choose to.’ 
 The Australian Department of Health and Ageing, 2009 
1. Introduction 
In this study, we take advantage of a unique setting of the Australian market for out-of-
hospital services, which has unregulated doctor fees. To examine how doctors use this 
freedom, we draw on a large population survey that is linked to administrative data records. 
Specifically, we ask the question: do specialist doctors charge higher fees to their high-
income patients and extract a greater surplus for the same services than they do for their 
low-income patients? 
In Australia, the tax-financed universal public health insurance, Medicare, provides a 
government-determined fixed rebate for each type of medical service. These rebates set a 
floor price for a given service but there are no controls over the maximum fees that doctors 
can charge to their patients. The patient pays the gap between the doctor’s fee and the 
Medicare rebate as an out-of-pocket (OOP) cost. OOP costs are equal to zero when the 
doctor’s fee is equal to the rebate. No private health insurance can be purchased for out-of-
hospital services that are covered by Medicare. 
With a gatekeeping system, patients need a referral from their general practitioner (GP) to 
see a specialist. Johar (2012) shows that fee discrimination by patient income exists at the 
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GP level where high-income patients pay on average 25% (AU$9.28) more than low-income 
patients for a standard GP consultation with the same GP. This gap is found despite the fact 
that in Australia patients can go to the GP of their choice.1 Johar’s study is the first paper 
that exposes GPs’ fee-setting behaviour at the GP level, and uses direct observation of the 
patients’ own income. In this study, we use the same datasets but examine the market for 
specialist consultations. 
There are several distinguishing features of the specialist market that underline the 
importance of this study. First, patients face considerably higher OOP costs for specialist 
care than they do for GP care. As at June 2014, patients on average, incurred around 
AU$102 in OOP costs per specialist and around AU$5 per GP visit. Furthermore, patients 
face zero OOP costs for 84% of all GP consultations, whereas the corresponding figure for 
specialist attendance is only 39% (Department of Health, 2014). Hence, the degree of price 
discrimination among specialists is likely to have greater bearing on the equity of access. 
Second, there are higher transaction costs for patients who switch their specialist provider. 
Patients not only need a referral from their GP, but their referral letter is specific to a named 
specialist. Switching specialists would require another appointment with a GP to obtain a 
new referral letter. These restrictions pose barriers to price competition and may lead to 
greater price discrimination, compared to the GP market. Third, GPs are financially 
encouraged to price discriminate through Medicare, whilst specialists are not. A GP will 
receive an additional financial incentive if their fee is the same as the Medicare rebate for 
patients who are less than 16 years old, or those who are concession card holders. Most 
people aged 65 and older have a concession card, as well as those who are on low incomes 
                                                          
1 There is no restriction by geographic area or by insurance membership e.g., fund holding GP system in the UK, 
where patients can go to GPs who are part of the arrangement.     
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or who are eligible for specific government pensions or allowances. Finally, Australians see 
their specialists less frequently than their GP. In our survey sample, only 55% of respondents 
had a consultation with a specialist in a given year;2 of those, 30% visited a specialist once 
and 20% visited twice. This provides specialists with fewer opportunities to obtain 
information on patient characteristics (such as income) that could be used as the basis for 
price discrimination.  
The main objective of this paper is to determine whether there is a significant gap between 
the fees charged by specialists to low- and high-income patients for a homogenous service -
an initial attendance. In addition, we examine heterogeneity in the fee gaps for different 
types of specialists, and investigate several patient characteristics that could help specialists 
identify their low- and high-income patients.  
2. Data and method  
Our patient data are derived from the 45 and Up Study. It is the largest follow-up health 
study conducted in the southern hemisphere, involving more than 267,000 non-
institutionalised people aged 45 and over in the state of New South Wales (NSW) in 
Australia (45 and Up Study collaborators, 2008). NSW is the most populous state in Australia 
and men and women aged 45+ in NSW were randomly selected to participate in this study. 
Individuals were only surveyed once during the period 2006-10, with the majority of data 
being collected in 2008. The representativeness of the sample has been documented in 
Johar et al. (2012). The 45 and Up Study is linked to multiple health administrative datasets 
by the Sax Institute, including the Medicare Benefits Schedule (MBS) data from the 
Department of Human Services between 2005 and 2011. The MBS data contain records of 
                                                          
2 This number matches well with the findings of the Patient Experiences in Australia 2013-2014 survey by the 
Australian Bureau of Statistics (http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/mf/4839.0). 
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medical services provided out of hospital by a range of health providers, and have 
information on the type of services and the total fees charged by the providers. Each 
provider is distinguished by a de-identified provider ID, which identifies his/her patient pool.  
With this linked dataset, we obtain the medical claims information for the survey 
respondents, whom we refer to as ‘patients’ in this study. The 45+ population is a major 
consumer group of health care services, absorbing around 62% of the nation’s total health 
expenditure (AIHW, 2010). The large sample size of the 45 and Up Study gives us a large 
number of observed services provided by many different providers. In fact, we observe 
more than 530,000 specialist consultation services each year.  
For the purpose of this paper, we need to focus on a homogenous service. We choose the 
initial consultation with a specialist (MBS item number 104). The Medicare rebate for this 
service item was AU$68.75 in 2010, but the average fee charged by specialists was 
AU$124.62.  
We obtain patient income information from the 45 and Up Study data. We focus on the top 
and bottom income groups, with high-income patients defined as those with household 
income in the top 25% of the income distribution (more than AU$70,000 per year). Low-
income patients are those with household income in the bottom 25% (less than AU$20,000 
per year).3 
For this analysis, we refine our sample as follows. First, we select specialists who charge at 
least one item 104 (initial attendance) to 45 and Up study participants over a two year 
period. This observation period equates to 12 months before and after the participant’s 
survey completion date. Though a longer observation period is available in the 
                                                          
3 There are 8 income categories in the survey, with the top group top-coded at AU$70,000.  
7 
 
administrative data, this restriction minimises potential errors that may be caused by 
changes in patient income (which has been collected only once). We identify 4,202 
specialists within this observation period. Since the survey dates vary among individuals, we 
normalised the fees to the price level in 2010. Second, for patients with multiple services 
under item 104 with a specialist during the two-year period, which may occur due to the 
treatment of a different health condition, only the earliest consultation is used in the 
analysis.4 Only 8% of patients had multiple services under item 104. Among these patients, 
94.3% visited the specialist twice and most of these visits were charged the same price. 
Furthermore, we restrict our sample to specialists who have the capacity to discriminate 
their fees for high- and low-income earners. As such, we include only specialists who see at 
least one low-income patient (bottom 25% of the household income distribution) and one 
high-income patient (top 25%) during the observation period. This reduces the sample to 
2,325. We also exclude observations with missing values on a specialist’s practice location 
and specialty (𝑛 = 8). Finally, we exclude specialists who charge all their patients a fee that 
is equivalent to the Medicare rebate, leaving a final sample size of 2,124. 
Sample selection may be a concern since only specialists with both low- and high-income 
patients are included in our sample. As fee setting behaviour may be substantially different 
for the other specialists with only low- or high-income patients, we check the coefficient of 
variation (standard deviation/mean) of the fees charged by the various specialists and find 
that they are comparable at around 0.32-0.38 (details can be found at Appendix A, Table A1). 
This suggests that specialists practice a similar extent of fee variation, even when they have 
only low or high income patients. We also find there is a similar extent of price 
                                                          
4 As this is arbitrary, we also used the most expensive fee and average fee, and found that the results are 
robust. There are only a small number of people with multiple services under item 104. 
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discrimination at least towards low-income patients. As our definition for low-income 
(bottom 25%) uses three income categories in the survey instrument, we can define 
patients in the lowest two income categories as the “bottom-low” and designate the third 
income category as the “top-low” group. The average fee gaps between the “top-low-” and 
“bottom-low-” income patients among specialists who see both high- and low-income 
patients and specialists who see only low-income patients are $3.14 and $5.77 respectively, 
and they are not significantly different from each other5.   
As we can identify an individual specialist, we conduct person-level analysis and compute 
the fee gap between high-income patients and low-income patients for each specialist. We 
then take the average of the fee gaps across specialists. There is no information about the 
specialists’ characteristics such as their gender or education. However, this limitation does 
not restrict our person-level analysis as a specialist’s characteristics are fixed across their 
own patients. To check for heterogeneity in fee gaps, we compute the fee gaps by practice 
location (major cities vs regional/remote areas and socioeconomically advantaged vs 
disadvantaged areas) and by medical specialty.  
3. Results  
Figure 1 presents the distribution of the gap between fees charged to high- and low-income 
patients. Around 80% of specialists charge higher average fees to their high-income patients. 
The median fee gap is AU$24.76, while 20% of specialists charge at least AU$50 more to 
their high-income patients compared to their low-income patients.  
                                                          
5 Unfortunately, we cannot do the same disaggregation for the richest patients because the top 25% of the 
income distribution is captured by a single income category in the dataset. 
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Table 1 summarises the average fees and fee gaps for high- and low-income patients in 
general and by practice locations. The overall average fee gap is AU$26.38 (about 38% of 
the Medicare rebate). The average fee for low-income patients is AU$47 above the 
Medicare rebate and AU$74 for high-income patients. Now to ascertain that this gap is not 
simply an artefact of the relationship between the specialist and the referring GP, we 
provide several supporting evidences. First, we trace each specialist consultation back to the 
referring GP and identify the specialists whom each GP refers to. It is possible that GPs tend 
to refer high income patients to specialists who typically charge high fees and poor patients 
to specialists who usually charge low fees. We classify specialists into 3 groups: specialists 
who see both high-income and low-income patients (SP1), low-income patients only (SP2), 
and high-income patients only (SP3) over the observation period. The figures in Appendix A, 
Table A2, show that the vast majority of high-income and low-income patients (over 95%) 
are referred to specialists who see both high- and low-income patients, suggesting no 
support for the hypothesis that the choice of specialist made by a GP which is matched with 
the income of his/her patients. Second, we also cross check the types of referral by the 
types of GPs. We classify GPs into the 3 groups: GPs who see both high-income and low-
income patients (GP1), low-income patients only (GP2), and high-income patients only (GP3), 
and cross-tabulate GP and SP types. Appendix A Table A3 indicates that, although SP2 (SP3) 
do not have patients referred from GP3 (GP2), the majority of patients for all three groups 
of specialists are from GP1 (the mixed income group).  
Panel A of Table 1 shows variations in fees and fee gaps by the remoteness of specialists’ 
practice location. We use the Accessibility/Remoteness Index of Australia (ARIA)6  to 
categorise practice locations into those located in a major city and those located in regional 
                                                          
6 Produced by the Australian Population and Migration Research Centre at the University of Adelaide 
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or remote areas (‘outside major city’). In the city, we may expect demand for specialist 
services to be larger, but the market is also more concentrated. Nevertheless, Table 1 shows 
that specialists in major cities can still charge very high fees to high-income patients, 
generating a larger fee gap compared to specialists who practise outside the city.  
Panel B of Table 1 shows how fees and fee gaps vary by socio-economic status of the 
specialists’ practice locations. We use the Australian Bureau of Statistics’ Socio-Economic 
Indexes for Areas (SEIFA) Index of Relative Socio-Economic Disadvantage (IRSD) to define 
the most disadvantaged, the mid-disadvantaged and the least disadvantaged areas. It is 
found that the fees for both high- and low-income patients are positively correlated with 
the socio-economic wellness of the area. The average fee gap is the widest in the best-off 
areas; however, it is not the lowest in the most disadvantaged areas. This is because in mid-
disadvantaged areas, low-income patients are charged relatively high fees. Importantly, the 
figures also indicate the pro-rich distribution of specialists’ practice locations.  In our sample, 
less than 10% of specialists are located in areas considered to be in the bottom 20% of the 
socio-economic advantage index, whereas almost 30% are located in areas identified to be 
in the highest 20% of socio-economic advantage index. 
Table 2 shows variation in fees and fee gaps by type of specialists. We rank the speciality 
according to the fee gap to examine which type of specialist price discriminates patients the 
most.7 Large variations in fee gaps are observed across different specialties - from the 
largest gap of AU$53.01 for neurosurgeons (about 77% of the Medicare rebate) to the 
smallest gap of AU$14.69 for oral surgeons (about 18% of the Medicare rebate). 
                                                          
7 Of the 4,202 specialists considered in the sample, 220 specialists have more than one specialty recorded in 




Given the limited number of interactions between a patient and specialist at the time of the 
initial consultation, we examine possible pathways by which personal income information 
could be obtained. We test five possible income proxies: health concession card status, age, 
private health insurance status8, employment status, and socio-economic characteristics of 
a patient’s residential area (SEIFA-IRSD score). We calculate the mean fee gap between two 
patient subgroups classified by the selected individual characteristics (e.g. concession card 
vs non-concession card holders) within the high-income and low-income patient group 
separately. A non-zero fee gap indicates that there is fee discrimination based on these 
variables.  
The results in Table 3 explore whether certain patient characteristics can help explain the 
mechanisms by which specialists identify low- and high-income patients. The results in Table 
3 show that, firstly, the mean fees for high-income patients are always higher than the 
mean fees for low-income patients, even after accounting for the patient characteristics. For 
example, for those with a concession card the fee gap between high- and low-income 
earners is AU$22.  Whilst this gap is smaller than the overall gap of AU$26 (Table 1), it 
suggests that specialists use additional means to determine price discrimination. Second, 
the fee gaps are significantly smaller for high-income groups than for low-income groups (p-
values of 0.00 from classical two sample mean tests), with the exception of health card 
status and SEIFA. This suggests that age, private health insurance status and work status 
play bigger roles in the price discrimination among low-income patients than for high-
income patients. An explanation for this is that specialists can identify high-income patients 
                                                          
8 Note that private health insurance does not cover out-of-hospital consultations, and does not directly affect 
the reimbursement of specialists’ services studied here. 
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easily, but need additional information about patient characteristics to identify low-income 
patients. 
4. Conclusions  
This study shows that in an unregulated fee-setting environment the vast majority of 
specialists charge higher fees to higher income patients. This is particularly relevant in the 
Australian setting where higher doctor fees translate into higher OOP costs for patients, and 
therefore directly influence access to care. 
The results also show that the observable patient characteristics helps explain some of the 
fee gap between high and low income patients but that fee gaps persist even after 
disaggregating by each of these characteristics. Interestingly, these characteristics matter 
more for the low-income patients than for high-income patients, and suggests that 
specialists find it easier to identify high-income patients without the need for additional 
information. 
Our findings are consistent with profit maximisation behaviour among specialists, given that 
low-income patients are more price sensitive than their wealthier counterparts (see for 
example Kiil and Houlberg, 2014; Keeler, 1992; Remler & Greene, 2009). That said, the 
results are also consistent with notions of fairness where specialists charge lower fees to 
those on low incomes. However, despite the presence of discounted specialists’ fees to low 
income patients, OOP costs remain substantial when compared to other health care 
providers such as GPs. There might be a case for devising incentives for specialists to charge 
low-income patients lower fees, similar to those in the GP market, to help remove some of 
these barriers. High income earners are greater users of specialist care than low income 
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earners (Van Doorslaer et al. 2008), and this is reflected in our study through the higher 
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All  $142.50 $116.13 $26.38 2,124 
A.     
Outside major city  
(inner regional, outer regional, and remote areas) 
$129.52 $111.40 $18.13 406 
Major city $145.57 $117.25 $28.33 1,718 
B.     
Most disadvantaged local areas (SEIFA-IRSD deciles 1-2) $130.77 $102.96 $27.81 205 
Mid disadvantaged local areas (SEIFA-IRSD deciles 3-8) $140.82 $115.83 $24.98 1,333 
















Neurosurgery $206.14 $153.12 $53.01 24 1.13% 
Dermatology $145.18 $107.84 $37.34 181 8.52% 
Otorhinolaryngology $144.13 $112.81 $31.33 148 6.96% 
General-surgery $136.29 $105.57 $30.72 383 18.03% 
Urology $153.40 $125.01 $28.39 114 5.36% 
Ophthalmology $134.24 $107.12 $27.12 371 17.46% 
Vascular-surgery $140.02 $113.94 $26.08 27 1.27% 
Obstetrics & Gynaecology $149.25 $125.41 $23.84 267 12.56% 
In vitro fertilisation (IVF) $136.57 $113.85 $22.72 15 0.71% 
Radiology oncology $128.08 $105.66 $22.41 91 4.28% 
Cardio-thoracic surgery $139.50 $117.77 $21.73 33 1.55% 
Orthopaedic surgery $149.72 $132.25 $17.47 334 15.72% 
Plastic surgery $143.11 $126.16 $16.95 104 4.89% 
Oral surgery  $121.08 $106.39 $14.69 16 0.75% 
Other specialtiesa $116.52 $98.26 $18.26 16 0.75% 
Total    2,124 100% 






Table 3: Results for mechanism checks - comparison of mean fee gaps 
Patients’ income 




Non-concession card holders  $142.67  
$8.25  
652 
Concession card holders $134.42 
Low income 
Non-concession card holders  $117.96 
$6.03 
Concession card holders $111.93 
High income 





Aged 65 or over $135.06 
Low income 
Aged less than 65 $126.05 
$14.34 
Aged 65 or over $111.71 
High income 




No private health insurance $140.66 
Low income 
Have private health insurance $117.40 
$6.38 
No private health insurance $111.02 
High income 














Bottom quantile of SEIFA for residential areas $145.20 
Low income 
Top quantile of SEIFA for residential areas  $116.81 
$3.19 
Bottom quantile of SEIFA for residential areas $113.62 
Note: We perform two-sample mean difference tests to test whether the high- and low-income gaps are significantly 
different from each other. The test results suggest that patients’ work status, private health insurance status, and age are 








Table A1: Coefficient of variation in fees by three types of specialists 
 
SP types  Coefficient of variation in fees 




SP1: SPs who see both high and low income patients. SP2: SPs who see low-income patients only. SP3: SPs who 





Table A2: GP referral patterns by patient types 
 
 Percentage of GP referrals 
Referred to Low-income patients High-income patients 
SP1 96.13% 95.97% 
SP2 3.87% 0% 
SP3 0% 4.03% 
Notes: 
SP1: SPs who see both high and low income patients. SP2: SPs who see low-income patients only. SP3: SPs who 





Table A3: Percentage of referrals by GP and SP types 
 
 Percentage of referrals 
 SP1 SP2 SP3 
GP1 85.66% 62.71% 59.96% 
GP2 6.82% 37.29% 0% 
GP3 7.52% 0% 40.04% 
Notes: 
SP1/GP1: SPs/GPs who see both high and low income patients. SP2/GP2: SPs/GPs who see low-income 
patients only. SP3/GP3: SPs/GPs who see high-income patients only. The number of referrals is measured by 
the number of Item 104 in MBS. 
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